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Transformative Use and  
Comment on the Original 
THREATS TO APPROPRIATION IN CONTEMPORARY 
VISUAL ART 
INTRODUCTION 
Art and rules do not often go well together. To imagine 
an artist pondering the Copyright Act and conforming to case 
law as part of the creative process is bizarre if not laughable. 
Some United States courts, however, seem to disagree. In March 
of 2011, a district court in the Southern District of New York 
held that appropriation artist Richard Prince had unlawfully 
infringed photographer Patrick Cariou’s copyrighted works 
when he tore pages from Cariou’s photography book Yes, Rasta 
and used them in collages for his own collection entitled Canal 
Zone.1 Prince unsuccessfully argued that his work constituted 
fair use—a defense to copyright infringement that deems an 
otherwise infringing use to be lawful for policy reasons.2 The 
Cariou v. Prince decision is a high profile, yet not 
unprecedented,3 reaction to visual art that comments on prior 
works through appropriation. 
The contemporary concept of appropriation in the visual 
arts originated about a century ago with the advent of artists 
such as Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque and their use of 
  
 1 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). This past 
April, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing in part the 
District Court’s decision. Finding that the lower court incorrectly required that the new 
work comment on the original, the Court of Appeals determined that twenty-five of the 
thirty paintings in the Canal Zone series constitute fair use. While this decision 
substantially thaws Judge Batts’ initial ruling, together, the three Cariou opinions, one 
from the district court and the two from the Second Circuit, only underscore the need for a 
clearer fair use standard. Cariou v. Prince Cariou (II), 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 2 See generally Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 346-47. 
 3 See Rogers v. Koons, 950 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting pop 
artist’s fair use defense despite the use of different medium and evidence of social 
commentary in work); Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684, 2013 WL 440127, at *13 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (rejecting street artist’s fair use defense); Friedman v. Guetta, 
No. Civ. 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (same). 
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collage.4 While occasionally throughout the twentieth century 
artists have faced copyright claims, these cases have settled for 
the most part, with few lasting long enough to set any 
legitimate precedent.5 But recently, artists have become 
increasingly litigious.6 And many of these modern cases involve 
major art world players, such as Shepard Fairey, Ryan McGinley, 
and, of course, Richard Prince.7 These wealthy and successful 
artists might not face crippling financial consequences by 
defending or settling these lawsuits, and they are often 
unsympathetic defendants, but the effect of a decision against 
one of them could have vast consequences.  
The goal of copyright law, under the U.S. Constitution, 
is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”8 Too 
often, however, in an effort to zealously protect the rights of 
authors, courts and litigants lose sight of this end. More 
importantly, overprotection of copyright can actually hinder 
  
 4 Picasso and Braque are typically associated with the beginnings of 
appropriation art for their use of collage in works of art. Clement Greenberg, Collage, 
in ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 70-71 (1961); see also Timothy Anglin Burgard, 
Picasso and Appropriation, 73 ART BULL. 479, 479 (1991) (“[Picasso] perceived 
appropriation as a magical transference of power that could be applied to both 
historical and contemporary art and to objects and people.”). 
 5 Cat Weaver, Law vs. Art Criticism: Judging Appropriation Art, 
HYPERALLERGIC (May 5, 2011), http://hyperallergic.com/23589/judging-appropriation-
art/ (“[M]ost copyright infringement cases defer to a ‘tradition of settling’.”). Renowned 
pop-artist Andy Warhol faced infringement claims for using another artist’s image of 
flowers and for his use of the Campbell’s soup can images, but he wound up settling 
both claims out of court. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and 
Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 n.10, 18 (2000); 
E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1475 n.12, 1484 (1993). The transformative use standard is 
derived from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, a case dealing with music sampling. See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).  
 6 Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Why Is Copyright (Suddenly) a Hot Topic for 
Artists?, CLANCCO, (Feb. 19, 2010), http://clancco.com/wp/2010/02/hot-topics-copyright-
art/. Mr. Sarmiento argues that the current economic recession, the increased 
awareness of the value of visual art, and education about legal rights are all factors 
that have contributed to the rise in copyright litigation in recent years. Id.; see also 
Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, at AR1, available 
at http://nytimes.com/2012102/01/arts/design/richard-prince-lawsuit-focuses-on-limits-
of-appropriation.html (“[A]rt lawyers say that legal challenges are now coming at a 
faster pace . . . because the art market has become a much bigger business and because 
of the extent of the borrowing ethos.”). 
 7 Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P. Over Obama Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
9, 2009, at C1; Walter Robinson, Cariou v. Prince: More on Artists’ Copyright Claims, 
ARTNET (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/robinson/artists-
copyright-claims-12-16-11.asp. Not to be forgotten, superstar artist Jeff Koons has 
singlehandedly contributed to much of the American case law concerning fair use and 
appropriation art. See generally Rogers, 950 F.2d 301, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006), and Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D. N.Y. 2011). 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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progress when too much material is off limits. The fair use 
exception is designed to redirect copyright toward its goal by 
allowing uses that are desirable. In other words, fair use 
applies when the law would otherwise deem a work infringing 
that, for policy reasons, should be permitted.9  
Determining whether a specific act of copying falls 
under fair use involves a four-factor analysis.10 Although courts 
examine all four factors,11 the first factor—which considers “the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes”12—is often central to the analysis. In Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,13 the Supreme Court relied on a 
Harvard Law Review article written by Judge Pierre N. Leval 
to introduce the “transformative” nature of the work as a prong 
of the first fair use factor.14 According to Judge Leval, a 
transformative work “must be productive and must employ the 
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose 
than the original.”15 The transformative use question is now “at 
the heart of . . . fair use” claims, particularly those that deal 
with appropriation art.16 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
  
 9 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.  
 10 Under § 107, the fair use analysis examines:  
(1) the purpose and character of the [allegedly infringing] use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.  
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). These four factors provide a guideline for courts to analyze fair 
use. However, they are not exclusive or determinative—a point that the Second Circuit 
recently made plain in its Cariou decision reversing in part the district court’s finding 
that none of Prince’s works constituted fair use. Cariou (II). 
 11 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (“All [four factors] are to be explored, 
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”) In some areas, 
however, doctrine has evolved that favors certain factors over others. One example of 
this is the doctrine of transformative use—the central topic of this note. Another is the 
emphasis on the second factor in cases where the underlying work is unpublished. See, 
e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985); New 
Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 12 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
 13 510 U.S. at 578. 
 14 See id. at 578-92. 
 15 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 
(1990). In the context of this note, the “quoted matter” means the appropriated work.  
 16 Meir Feder & Rajeev Muttreja, Circuit Addresses Limits of Fair Use in 
Visual Art, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 2011; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; Blanch v. 
Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 347-
48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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explained that a finding of transformativeness will render the 
other factors less persuasive.17  
The long-term dangers of an overly conservative 
transformative use (and, by extension, fair use) standard could 
drastically affect the art world and contemporary art 
movements. If the cost of paying for these lawsuits begins to 
outweigh the benefits of using appropriation, then the world’s 
most well-known artists might stop employing such practices.18 
The fear of facing a copyright infringement claim could have a 
chilling, if not silencing, effect on creative expression. It is 
important, therefore, to develop a more forgiving standard for 
dealing with claims of fair use in the visual arts in order to 
discourage litigation and thereby protect artists’ creative 
expression. Copyright law should adhere to the Constitutional 
purpose set out in Article 1 §8 cl. 8, and explained in greater 
detail in Judge Leval’s article, while protecting against 
legitimately threatening forms of infringement. A standard 
that evaluates whether the new work serves a different artistic 
purpose would allow artists the most freedom and still protect 
against piracy and counterfeiting. 
This note primarily addresses the visual arts.19 In the 
context of visual art, current fair use law does not effectively 
promote the goals of copyright. Accordingly, for visual art that 
incorporates images that would otherwise be infringing, fair 
  
 17 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not 
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote 
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works. . . . [T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 18 A common response to this issue is that the artists should license the 
images that they plan to use. This seems obvious from a legal standpoint; however, 
several practical problems can arise in a regime that requires artists to license every 
image that they use. See Landes, supra note 5, at 20 (“Transaction costs are likely to be 
large if the law required the artist to obtain permission to appropriate from multiple 
sources. Other things being the same, this implies that the law should be more 
sympathetic to the artist whose work borrows from multiple copyrighted sources.”); 
Weaver, supra note 5 (referring to appropriation artist Hank Willis Thomas’s 
commentary about the difficulties associated with securing permissions and the eighty-
two images used in one of his projects, Cat Weaver stated: “One could spend a few years 
garnering enough permissions to compile eighty-two relevant images.” (emphasis added)). 
 19 While some commentators believe that “the objective of copyright could be 
better achieved if the visual arts had a distinct and separate fair use regime,” Stephen 
E. Weil, Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or Please Leave Some Room for Robin Hood, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 835 (2001), it is plausible that other areas of copyright could benefit 
from the standard set forth below as well. In order to translate, the weight of each 
factor and the qualities that are deemed important would likely vary from literature to 
the visual arts to the dramatic arts, etc.  
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use—and particularly transformative use—analysis should 
focus not on whether the secondary work comments specifically 
on the original, but instead on whether the new work serves a 
different artistic purpose than the original. This new 
interpretation would distinguish impermissible counterfeiting 
from permissible and desirable uses.  
Part I begins by outlining the major topics necessary for 
the analysis. First, it surveys the history of appropriation art. It 
then provides a brief background of copyright law, fair use, and 
transformative use. Finally, Part I emphasizes the policy goals 
behind the transformative use doctrine and introduces how the 
doctrine functions in the context of visual arts litigation.  
Part II introduces Cariou v. Prince. It explains the facts 
behind the case, illustrates the arguments made by each party, 
and details the reasoning the court relied on to reach its decision. 
Part III spells out the issues that this note attempts to 
address. It predicts the implications that Cariou might have for 
the art world and artists and warns of the dangers of a strict 
fair use and transformative use standard. It also explains and 
critiques two existing attempts at tackling these issues: the 
Creative Commons movement and Professor Lawrence Lessig’s 
approach, which earmarks certain restrictions and deems all 
other copying fair use.  
Part IV attempts to solve the problems introduced in 
Part III by proposing a new standard for transformative use. 
This standard, which is rooted in Judge Leval’s seminal article, 
suggests that a secondary work need not comment on the 
original and instead must have a different artistic purpose. 
This section then explains the factors that would determine 
whether a work has a different artistic purpose and is therefore 
transformative. This interpretation of Leval’s theory leaves 
more room for artists to work freely, yet respects the rights of 
copyright owners by essentially granting a thin copyright 
protection and preventing pure piracy.  
Appropriation often has the effect of making artwork 
more accessible to the public. When people recognize an image, 
they can engage with the work; viewers are then able to relate 
to and understand the work and, ideally, find some meaning 
within the work.20 While movements like abstract expressionism 
can be incredibly powerful to the learned observer, the layperson 
  
 20 See Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative 
Value: Appropriation Art’s Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 
BROOK. L. REV 1653, 1656 (1995). 
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often has more difficulty connecting with a work of art. Amateur 
viewers cannot take the first step of engaging with the piece and 
often leave frustrated or confused. Surely the copyright clause 
was not written with only art historians in mind. With respect to 
the visual arts, the ends of copyright are better served if more 
people can extract meaning from the visual arts. If copyright 
law becomes so restrictive that the risks of appropriating 
outweigh the benefits, however, modern culture will suffer.  
I. APPROPRIATION ART AND FAIR USE 
A. Appropriation in the Visual Arts 
Appropriation has long been a device artists use to 
comment on their contemporary surroundings. From Picasso to 
Duchamp and the Dada to Pop Art and other postmodern 
movements, appropriation of images or objects has served to 
communicate messages about contemporary society and the 
nature of art itself.21 Appropriation art, as a movement, often 
refers to a period during the 1980s where artists experimented 
with using recognizable images from pop culture in works of 
fine art.22 Richard Prince—along with artists such as Jeff 
Koons, Barbara Kruger, and Sherrie Levine—is often cited as 
an integral voice in the movement.23  
Today, artists continue to use appropriation as a 
method of reaching wider audiences, developing consistency in 
a body of work, or commenting on the work of others.24 
  
 
21
 See generally Appropriation, TATE GLOSSARY, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120203094030/http://www.tate.org.uk/coll
ections/glossary/definition.jsp?entryId=23 (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
 22 See Johanna Burton, Subject to Revision//2004, in DAVID EVANS, 
APPROPRIATION 206 (2009) (“In the 1980’s, appropriation came to be seen as one 
particularly effective means to reveal the working mechanisms of various cultural, 
social and psychic institutions—and thus considerations of subjectivity and identity 
necessarily surfaced in such deconstructive terrain.”). 
 23 See Thomas Crow, The Return of Hank Herron, in EVANS, supra note 22, at 88; 
Roberta Smith, Pilfering From a Culture Out of Joint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at E33, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/arts/design/28prin.html?pagewanted=all. 
 24 There are several contemporary movements and artists that use 
appropriation in their work. Superflat is a contemporary art movement attributed to 
the painter Takashi Murakami. Marc Steinberg, Otaku Consumption, Superflat Art, 
and the Return to Edo, 16 JAPAN F. 449, 450 (2004). The style incorporates images of 
Japanese comics and characters called manga. Id.  
  Artist Roger Shimomura uses images of superheroes, cartoons, and racist 
imagery in contemporary American culture to point out the way that Asians and Asian 
Americans are perceived in America. KARA KELLEY HALLMARK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ASIAN AMERICAN ARTISTS: ARTISTS OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 191(2007). 
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Moreover, a new culture created by the Internet has had a 
massive effect on the arts and is “radically reordering the 
concept of appropriation.”25 Indeed, art reporter Randy Kennedy 
suggests that contemporary artists use appropriation “as a way 
to participate thoughtfully and actively in a culture that is 
highly circulated.”26 
The practice, however, lies directly in conflict with the 
law of copyright. The use of an image to create another work 
through appropriation almost necessarily implicates the 
derivative work right—and often the reproduction right as 
well.27 The conflict is unavoidable. Copyright offers an artist 
exclusive rights to reproduce and to create derivative works 
from her protected material,28 whereas appropriation art 
reproduces the work of another in order to create a new work. 
B. A Brief History of Copyright and Fair Use as Applied to 
Appropriation Art 
Copyright law is a fundamental body in the American 
legal system. Indeed, the right is preserved in the U.S. 
Constitution.29 The U.S. Copyright Act recognizes fixed works of 
authorship demonstrating sufficient originality.30 It bestows the 
exclusive right to, inter alia, reproduce, distribute, and create 
derivative works—subject to some exceptions.31 The 
  
  Murakami and Shimomura are not the only artists that incorporate 
appropriated images in their work. Many street artists use images from popular 
culture as references in their artwork. Anny Shaw, Street Artist Mr. Brainwash Sued 
over “Copied” Image, ART NEWSPAPER, issue 222, Mar. 9, 2011, available at 
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Street-artist-Mr-Brainwash-sued-over-
copied-image/23237. In recent years, street art—a movement grown out of graffiti art, 
but incorporating methods including stencil, collage, sticker art, and mosaic—has 
exploded from the underground to the mainstream art market. Seth Kugel, To the Trained 
Eye, Museum Pieces Lurk Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at TR13, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/travel/07iht-09weekend.10790192.html?_r=0.  
 25 Kennedy, supra note 6. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See infra Part I.B. for explanation of the derivative work right and the 
reproduction right. Daniel Grant, Will the Legal Status of Appropriation Art Be 
Decided This Year?, HUFFINGTON POST ARTS (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/art-appropriation-laws_b_1179326.html 
(quoting Robert J. Kasunic, principal legal adviser at the U.S. Copyright Office) 
(“Where derivativeness ends and transformative begins is not all clear.”) Often, the 
reproduction right is at issue as well, when an actual copy is fixed to the work. 
 28 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  
 29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]” Id. 
 30 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 31 Id. §§ 107-112. 
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reproduction right is fairly straightforward in that it deems as 
infringing any unauthorized, fixed copy of the original that is 
more than de minimis.32 A derivative work, on the other hand, 
is a “work based upon one or more preexisting works.”33 The 
derivative work right focuses on whether the copyrighted work 
has been “recast, transformed, or adapted” in the new work.34 
While the law recognizes these as distinct rights, the derivative 
work right and the reproduction right essentially overlap.35 
This is especially true in the visual arts where the reference 
must be visual and reproducing the original in the new work is 
critical.36 When an artist appropriates an image from another 
artist, several of the exclusive rights might be implicated. For 
example, Richard Prince’s Canal Zone collages would qualify as 
derivative works and reproductions.37 
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright 
infringement;38 accordingly, an infringing work that is deemed 
fair use is lawful.39 There are four factors considered in 
determining whether an otherwise infringing act will constitute 
fair use. These factors, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, are:  
1. the purpose and character of the use; 2. the nature of the 
copyrighted work; 3. the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; [and finally] 4. 
  
 32 See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
ECONOMY 302-03 (2010).  
 33 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 34 Id.; see also Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’n Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
 35 See Twin Peaks Prods.v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 (2d Cir. 
1993) (citing 2 NIMMER § 8.09[A]).  
 36 Whereas words can capture ideas in many different ways, in a work of 
visual art, references to other works are not explained, they are illustrated. Richard 
Prince captures this challenge when he discusses and defends his use of “re-
photography,” where he photographs other photographs:  
By generating what appears to be a double, it might be possible to represent 
what the original photograph or picture imagined . . . . More technological 
than mechanical, more a simulation than an expression, the result is a 
photograph that’s the closest thing to the real thing. And since I feel a bit 
more comfortable, perhaps more reassured around a picture that appears to 
be truer than it really is, I find the best way for me to make it real is to make 
it again, and making it again is enough for me and certainly, personally 
speaking, almost me.  
LISA PHILLIPS, RICHARD PRINCE 28 (1992).  
 37 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 38 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
 39 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.40  
Not all factors must be met in order for a work to qualify as fair 
use—instead, courts will engage in a balancing test.41 When 
dealing with appropriation art, however, the analysis typically 
involves an emphasis on the first factor and more specifically 
whether the use is transformative—a question under the first 
factor analysis.42 
In the first U.S. case to introduce the idea of a fair use 
defense, Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story held that the defendant’s 
copy of a George Washington biography was an infringing copy, 
stressing that the test was whether the secondary use 
“superseded the use of the original work.”43 While this case did not 
find fair use or, in the court’s terms, “fair abridgement,” it 
acknowledged that there are instances where otherwise 
infringing uses might be excused.44 From Folsom, the fair use 
doctrine continued to develop. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that this defense “permits [and requires] courts 
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is 
designed to foster.”45 Fair use thus developed as an effort to 
steer the law toward copyright’s ultimate goal—to foster the 
progress of art and science—where the exclusive rights 
themselves would hinder such progress. 
Fair use analysis is intentionally vague.46 Courts engage 
in a subjective analysis when considering the fair use defense, 
focusing on the facts of each case to determine whether the 
exception applies.47 Originally, this approach was necessary to 
balance the conflicting interests of copyright protection and 
  
 40 Id. 
 41 See supra note 10. 
 42 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006); Cariou, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d at 347. 
 43 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) 
(“[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and 
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other 
hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a 
view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the 
review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy.”). 
 44 Id. at 345. 
 45 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 46 Congress “eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use.” Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31& 449 (1984). 
 47 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 
2539 (2009). 
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free expression.48 But as the law has developed, and as the 
tendency to litigate over copyright infringement has 
increased,49 the unpredictable nature of the inquiry has given 
way to dangerous results, particularly for genres of art that 
rely on the use of appropriated images. 
C. The Evolution of the Transformative Use Doctrine 
Traditionally, the first factor of the fair use defense—
“the purpose and character of the use”—has been essential to 
fair use analyses dealing with the visual arts.50 And prior to the 
introduction of the transformative use prong in 1994, courts 
evaluated the first fair use factor only slightly differently than 
they do today. In Rogers v. Koons, for example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit was not persuaded by artist Jeff 
Koons’s defense that his life size, colorful sculpture, String of 
Puppies, was a parody of modern society and therefore a fair 
use of photographer Art Rogers’s black and white photographic 
postcard, Puppies.51 The court determined that Koons copied 
Rogers’s photograph “in bad faith, primarily for profit making 
motives, and [in a way that] did not constitute a parody of the 
original work.”52 
The Second Circuit explained that Koons’s use failed 
under § 107 because the original was not necessary to the 
work; in other words, Koons was not communicating a message 
about Rogers’s Puppies, but instead he was making a more 
general statement about banality and kitsch.53 The court 
“insist[ed] that the audience be aware that underlying the 
parody there is an original and separate expression, attributable 
to a different artist.”54  
  
 48 Fair use is considered one of the ways that copyright law remains in 
balance with the First Amendment. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190-91 (2003). 
 49 Erin Coe, IP Litigation Takes Off in First Half of 2011, LAW360 (July 6, 
2011, 5:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/256106/ip-litigation-takes-off-in-first-
half-of-2011. 
 50 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250-56 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 51 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308-10.  
 52 Id. at 310. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. The Second Circuit explained that parody is “when one artist, for comic 
effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist and in doing so 
creates a new work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original.” Id. 
at 309-10. While the court in Rogers did not discuss the doctrine of transformative use, 
it nevertheless explained that a parody will likely constitute fair use. Id. Later, in 
Campbell, the Supreme Court framed parody as part of the transformative use 
question. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court also 
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Two years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the U.S. 
Supreme Court introduced “transformative use” into the fair 
use analysis.55 Originating with an article written by Judge 
Pierre N. Leval, the transformative use doctrine asks whether 
the secondary work “adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message . . . .”56 The Court adopted the 
Leval standard, stating that “the central purpose of [the first 
factor] is to see . . . whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’”57 The Court, however, also embraced the 
concept, central to the Rogers court, which requires the 
appropriating artist to comment on the specific original work.58 
Although Campbell dealt with the issue of music 
sampling, in the years since the Supreme Court’s decision, 
visual arts cases have tracked the Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
branding Campbell an important landmark in fair use law and 
analysis.59 Written by Justice Souter, the Court in Campbell 
unanimously held that when determining fair use, “[a]ll [of the 
factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in 
light of the purposes of copyright.”60 The Court determined that 
the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew’s parody of the song “Pretty 
Woman” by Roy Orbison and William Dees was “not presumptively 
unfair [use]” of the copyrighted original.61 According to Justice 
Souter, and the rest of the majority, “the goal of copyright . . . is 
  
distinguished between parody and satire—stating that parody is accorded more fair 
use protection than satire. Id. at 580-81. The Second Circuit noted in Blanch, however, 
that “the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases involving parody” and 
found both that Koons’s painting was satirical and that it was transformative. Blanch, 
467 F.3d at 255. Accordingly, parody is an important and oft-emphasized inquiry in 
applying the transformative use doctrine, but should not be the end of the discussion.  
 55 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79. 
 56 Id. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 15, at 1111). 
 57 Id. at 579. 
 58 Id. at 580 (“For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, 
and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some 
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, 
comments on that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical 
bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged 
infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up 
something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes 
accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its 
commerciality, loom larger.”). 
 59 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 246; Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 
3510890 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 60 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (citing Leval, supra note 15, at 1110-11). 
 61 Id. at 594. The Court remanded the case to the lower court, which 
eventually found that 2 Live Crew’s song did not constitute fair use. Id.; see also 
Kennedy, supra note 25. 
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generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”62 
Thus, the transformative nature of a work should be given some 
degree of deference in a fair use analysis.63 
In Campbell, the Court deemed 2 Live Crew’s song 
transformative because it parodied the original work thus 
commenting directly on the “naiveté” of the original.64 The 
Supreme Court explained that, “[parody] can provide social 
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the 
process, creating a new one.”65 According to Judge Leval’s 
article, however, transformative use covers not just parody, but 
“may include . . . symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and 
innumerable other uses.”66 Like the standard proposed in this 
note, Judge Leval supports protecting a variety of uses rather 
than uses that focus only on the actual original. Judge Leval 
believes that the first factor is “a question of justification,” and 
that:  
[If] the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted 
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—[it is 
transformative because] this is the very type of activity that the fair 
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.67 
In the years since Campbell, courts have had difficulty 
shaping a test for whether a work is transformative absent 
instances where direct parody of the original work can be 
reasonably perceived in the secondary work.68  
In 2006, Jeff Koons once again found himself before the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. This time, however, Koons 
successfully put forth a fair use defense. In Blanch v. Koons, 
the court found that Koons’s painting, Niagra, was a fair use of 
photographer Andrea Blanch’s photograph published in Allure 
magazine.69 The court found that because Blanch had a 
different purpose in creating her advertisement than Koons did 
  
 62 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 63 Id. at 579. 
 64 Id. at 583. 
 65 Id. at 579. 
 66 Leval, supra note 15, at 1111. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (use of fashion 
photographer’s image in a collaged painting is transformative); Castle Rock Entm’t, v. 
Carol Publ’n Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 141-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (quiz book based on popular 
television show is not transformative of the television show); Warner Bros. Entm’t, v. 
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (encyclopedia of fictional 
stories is not transformative of the original novels). 
 69 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244. 
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in creating his painting, the use was transformative.70 
Moreover, the court found that Koons was commenting on 
Blanch’s photograph “by using Blanch’s image as fodder for his 
commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass 
media.”71 Although the Second Circuit mentioned the importance 
of commenting on the original, this explanation seemingly 
stretched the standards adopted in Campbell. Essentially, the 
court used a standard that looked at the purposes of the works 
themselves instead of rigidly requiring that the artist comment 
on the original.72  
The court emphasized the purposes for which each work 
was created, stating that Koons’s purpose in creating his painting 
was “sharply different” than Andrea Blanch’s in making her 
photograph.73 The court then concluded that the different 
“objectives” of each artist “confirm[ed] the transformative nature 
of the use.”74 In other words, the court was extremely sensitive to 
the “meaning” of Koons’s work and to the social commentary that 
he was making through his paintings.75  
Nevertheless, while this decision seemed to indicate 
sensitivity to the practice of appropriation, the court did not 
clearly condone this technique. As a result, artists remained 
susceptible to liability. And in Cariou, the federal district court 
attempted to narrow any freedom created by the Blanch decision.  
II. CARIOU V. PRINCE 
A. Factual Background 
For six years photographer Patrick Cariou lived with 
and photographed Rastafarians in their Jamaican landscape.76 
In 2000, Cariou published the photographs in a book entitled 
  
 70 Id. at 252 (“The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and 
Blanch had in creating [the original work] confirms the transformative nature of the use.”).  
 71 Id. at 253. 
 72 Quoting Campbell’s adoption of Judge Leval’s article, the court in Blanch 
stated that “[t]he test for whether [the secondary work’s] use of [the original] is 
‘transformative,’ then, is whether it ‘merely supersedes the objects of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression meaning or message.’” Id. (quoting Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). This standard more closely adheres 
to the one laid out in Judge Leval’s article.  
 73 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 252-53. 
 76 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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Yes, Rasta.77 Cariou did not display the photographs and did 
not market them other than in the book.78  
From the end of 2007 to February 2008, Richard Prince, 
a world-renowned appropriation artist,79 exhibited several of his 
new works at the Eden Rock Hotel in St. Barths.80 In one of the 
paintings, Canal Zone, Prince used thirty-five photographs 
from the Yes, Rasta book and applied them to a wooden board 
using “primitive collage technique.”81 This piece was to be the 
title work in Prince’s forthcoming collection and planned 
screenplay of the same name.82 Toward the end of 2008, Canal 
Zone opened at the Gagosian Gallery in the Chelsea 
neighborhood of New York City.83 
Canal Zone, the show, consisted of twenty-nine 
paintings, each featuring images collaged, sometimes tinted or 
cropped, often with Prince’s own drawing or brushstrokes 
overlaid.84 Most of the paintings were several feet tall.85 Richard 
Prince used at least forty-one photographs from Patrick 
  
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 344. 
 79 Richard Prince “is a leading member of the sprawling appropriation 
generation . . . that continues to add new recruits. . . .” Smith, supra note 23. “He 
started his career as a figure painter,” but was making collages by 1975. PHILLIPS, 
supra note 36, at 21. Prince’s rise to fame and recognition in the art world, however, 
came with his “rephotography” of magazine ads. The ultimate form of appropriation, 
Prince would photograph photographs. The result was puzzling: “To the viewer, 
Prince’s alterations may have seemed minimal, even nonexistent, but there was in fact 
dramatic transformation.” Id. at 27. Accordingly, the techniques he used in the Canal 
Zone series were hardly new to the artist’s process and arguably far less egregious to 
copyright owners than some of his past work. In the 1980s and 1990s, Prince created a 
body of work entitled Untitled (Cowboy), which consisted of photographs of 
advertisements as the entirety of the work. The Metropolitan Museum of Art described 
one of the pieces as “a copy (the photograph) of a copy (the advertisement) of a myth 
(the cowboy).” Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, Richard Prince: Untitled (Cowboy), 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/ 
2000.272 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The collection became one of Prince’s most 
acclaimed exercises in social commentary and expression; it was a symbol of the power 
of appropriation. 
 80 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 343; see also Deidre Woollard, Artist Richard 
Prince Exhibits in St. Barths at the Eden Rock Hotel, LUXIST (Nov. 17, 2007, 11:03 AM), 
http://www.luxist.com/2007/11/17/artist-richard-prince-exhibits-in-st-barths-at-the-
eden-rock-ho/. 
 81 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 343; Richard Prince “Canal Zone,” 
ARTNEWS.ORG, (Nov. 20, 2008), http://artnews.org/gallery.php?i=1263&exi=13838. 
 82 Prince, supra note 81. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See AO On Site: Richard Prince’s Canal Zone, Gagosian Gallery, Saturday, 
November 8th, Chelsea, New York, ART OBSERVED (Nov. 13, 2008), http://artobserved.com/ 
2008/11/ao-on-site-richard-princes-canal-zone-gagosian-gallery-saturday-november-8th-
chelsea-new-york/. 
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Cariou’s photography book Yes, Rasta.86 Some of Prince’s 
paintings “consist[ed] almost entirely of images taken from Yes, 
Rasta, . . . collaged, enlarged, cropped, tinted and/or over-
painted, while other[] [paintings] . . . use[d] [only] portions of 
Yes, Rasta as collage elements.”87 Additionally, Prince 
appropriated several images from other sources.88 Richard 
Prince was developing a storyline in this collection.89 Prince was 
channeling rock music, contemporary apocalyptic theories, 
heroes of the art world, such as DeKooning and Cezanne, and 
notions of his own life.90 The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York noted that some of the paintings in Canal 
Zone91 contained “substantial original painting,” while others 
relied on different artistic devices to alter the Yes, Rasta 
photographs and other collage elements in the scenes.92 
Though Cariou had only licensed the photographs in 
Yes, Rasta for that book—with the exception of a small few that 
he sold to friends—he testified that around the time Canal 
Zone showed in Chelsea, he had been negotiating with 
Christiane Celle, the owner of a small SoHo gallery in New 
York City to put on an exhibition of the collection.93 According 
to the record, negotiations came to a halt when Celle 
encountered the Canal Zone show.94 Alleging that she did not 
want to “capitalize” on Prince’s success or to show work that 
had “been ‘done already,’” Celle cancelled all plans.95 Cariou’s 
hopes of becoming a gallery artist almost a decade after he shot 
the Yes, Rasta series were dashed.96 
  
 86 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 343-44. 
 90 Id. at 344. 
 91 Hereinafter Canal Zone refers to the entire body of work at issue in 
Cariou, unless otherwise indicated. 
 92 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
 93 Id. Although the court did not question the arrangement between Celle 
and Cariou, attorneys for Prince challenged its credibility. See Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 20-22, Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 
2d 337 (No. 08 Civ. 11327), 2009 WL 3054517. The gallery was Clic Bookstore and 
Gallery owned by Celle. See id.; CLIC GALLERY, http://clicgallery.com/about/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
 94 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
 95 Id. 
 96 While Celle was indeed interested in representing Cariou, the deal never 
really materialized. In her testimony regarding the desire to represent the French 
photographer, Celle stated, “[w]e agree[d] on it but we never really pursue[d] it.” 
Memorandum of Law, supra note 93, at 21. Moreover, the Court of Appeals decision 
revealed that Celle was initially interested in an entirely different body of work by 
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In December 2008, Cariou filed a lawsuit against 
Richard Prince, Gagosian Gallery, Inc., and Lawrence 
Gagosian alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement.97 The 
defendants claimed fair use as an affirmative defense.98 
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
On March 18, 2011, Judge Deborah Batts issued her 
opinion granting summary judgment for plaintiff Patrick 
Cariou.99  
While the court noted that, in determining fair use, “all 
of the four factors are to be explored,” much of the opinion 
concentrated on the first factor: “the purpose and character of 
the use.”100 The court articulated the first factor as a three-
pronged inquiry: first, evaluating the transformative nature of 
the secondary work, then the commerciality, and finally 
whether the defendant acted in bad faith.101 
In determining whether Canal Zone employed a 
transformative use of the Yes, Rasta photos, Judge Batts 
emphasized the extent to which Canal Zone commented 
specifically on Cariou’s photographs, as well as Prince’s facial 
alterations to the photographs and his intent in making the art.102 
Whereas the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Blanch 
focused on the difference in the respective purposes of the artists, 
the Cariou court concentrated on whether the secondary work 
commented on the original.103 The district court opened the 
discussion by stating that “all of the precedent [the court could] 
identify imposes a requirement that the new work in some way 
comment on, relate to the historical context of, or critically refer 
back to the original works.”104 Judge Batts found that since 
  
Patrick Cariou—one that dealt with surfers and surfing culture. See Cariou v. Prince, 
714 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 97 Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at 2-3, Cariou, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 337 (No. 08 Civ. 11327), 2009 WL 956547. 
 98 Answer of Defendant, at ¶ 33, Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (No. 08 Civ. 
11327), 2009 WL 1632977. 
 99 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 355. 
 100 Id. at 347-48 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101 See id. at 347-52. 
 102 See id. at 348-50. 
 103 Id. at 349 (“Prince’s [p]aintings are transformative only to the extent that 
they comment on the [p]hotos.”). 
 104 See id. at 348. Of course, this ignores Blanch, in which Jeff Koons’ painting 
appropriated Andrea Blanch’s photograph “as fodder for his commentary on the social 
and aesthetic consequences of mass media,” rather than to make a comment about 
Blanch’s work. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F. 3d 244, 252 (2d. Cir. 2006). 
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Prince was not referring directly or commenting specifically on 
Cariou’s work, it was not analogous to other transformative use 
cases.105 She relied on Rogers for the notion that a “different 
artistic use”106 is not a justifiable basis for the transformative 
nature of a work and held that the paintings were 
“transformative only to the extent that they comment[ed] on 
[Cariou’s photographs].”107 
Richard Prince’s own testimony was integral in this line 
of analysis. Noting that “Prince testified that he has no interest 
in the original meaning of the photographs he used,” the court 
found that Prince therefore had no message to convey and that 
he “did not intend to comment on Cariou.” Instead, the court 
found that he endeavored to make “creative and new” work, 
which was “not transformative within the meaning of Section 
107.”108 Moreover, the court remarked on Prince’s testimony 
that his intent in using pictures, like the ones he took from Yes, 
Rasta, was to import truth and fact into his work, and the court 
took this to mean that Prince’s purpose in using Cariou’s 
pictures was “the same as Cariou’s original purpose in taking 
them: a desire to communicate to the viewer core truths about 
Rastafarians and their culture.”109  
The court further examined the actual facial 
transformations of the photographs. Judge Batts concluded 
that the transformative elements varied, and that “in the 
works most heavily drawn from Cariou’s [p]hotos . . . there is 
vanishingly little, if any, transformative element[.]”110 
Conversely, the court noted that “in those [works] where 
Cariou’s [p]hotos play a comparatively minor role, [Prince] has 
a stronger argument that his work is transformative of 
Cariou’s original [p]hotos.”111 The opinion, however, went on to 
grant summary judgment with respect to all of the works in the 
  
 105 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
 106 Id. (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 349. 
 109 Id. The court also used Prince’s testimony to find that he acted in bad 
faith. Since he explained that he did not implement a different standard in his use of 
copyrighted work as opposed to images in the public domain, and instead based the 
decision on “whether he likes the image,” Judge Batts found that Prince acted 
improperly. Id. at 9. Moreover, she found that because Prince did not attempt to 
contact Cariou in an effort to procure a license, this further supported a finding of bad 
faith. Id. However, if Prince thought at all about whether his use was lawful, he likely 
would have seen his work as fair use, and thus free from a licensing requirement. 
 110 Id. at 350. 
 111 Id.  
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Canal Zone series that used Cariou’s photographs, ordering 
that they be destroyed.112  
III. NARROW INTERPRETATION OF FAIR USE WILL CHILL 
ARTIST SPEECH 
A. Analysis and Implications of Cariou v. Prince 
Although this decision “set off alarm bells” in the art 
world, the legal reasoning is not unprecedented or 
extraordinarily unique.113 On one hand, Blanch seems to 
provide more freedom for these types of artists, while on the 
other, the precedent set by Rogers, and even Campbell, limits 
transformative use to parodies that comment on the specific 
original work.114 The Cariou decision relies on the second line of 
reasoning.115 Because courts have not yet set a definitive standard 
by which to judge whether a work of art is transformative, the 
analysis is much more subjective than necessary.  
Plainly, it was not Prince’s intent to portray “core truths 
about Rastafarians and their culture.”116 Prince incorporated 
Cariou’s images of Rastafarians in collages, both next to and 
beneath images of naked women, guitars, as well as his own 
lines, shapes, and brushstrokes. First, the title Canal Zone 
indicates that he must have had some personal connection to 
the work because Prince was born in the Panama Canal Zone.117 
Furthermore, the hints that Prince did give about the meaning 
of the work all dealt with apocalyptic landscapes; Prince even 
had a storyline to go along with the collection.118 There were 
  
 112 Id. at 355-56. The court also found that Prince’s gallery, Gagosian Gallery, 
as well as its owner, Lawrence Gagosian, was liable for vicarious and contributory 
infringement. Id. at 354. This finding prompted several prominent museums to file 
amicus briefs urging that the decision could “deter museums from acquiring and 
displaying important works.” Abigail Rubenstein, Museums, Google Back Richard 
Prince Fair Use Appeal, LAW360 (Nov. 3, 2011, 7:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
newyork/articles/283044. 
  On appeal, however, the Second Circuit analyzed the works individually, 
ultimately determining that twenty five of the thirty do constitute fair use. See Cariou 
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2013).  
 113 Kennedy, supra note 25. 
 114 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1994); 
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 115 Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
 116 Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 25 (“[T]he primary intention was to 
create a work of art . . . and that is the kind of creativity the law seeks to encourage.”). 
 117 See supra text accompanying note 103; see also Biography, RICHARD 
PRINCE, http://www.richardprince.com/bio/. 
 118 See supra text accompanying notes 103-105. 
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reasons that he chose Cariou’s pictures rather than any of the 
myriad images that might return on an online image search.119 
No critics or viewers interpreted Prince’s collages as imparting 
truthful accounts of Rastafarian culture, and instead they 
remarked on the title—which served to place the characters in 
Panama—as well as the collage techniques that Prince used in 
their creation.120 Most of Prince’s career has been spent 
appropriating images where his message is not about the 
image itself, but something bigger, deeper, and more 
powerful.121 In response to questions about his reasons for using 
appropriation in his work, Prince said that he “wanted to 
contribute to something that already existed in the world.”122 
For an artist that has been using the images of others for 
decades, to now have to guess whether his future work will 
land him at a defendant’s table will surely affect his freedom to 
work going forward. 
B. The Dangers of Strict Fair Use and Transformative Use 
Standards 
The importance of the visual arts cannot be 
understated. Notably, the advancement of the arts is more 
important than the protection of intellectual property because, 
as Judge Leval points out, it is the end to which copyright law 
is the means.123 But starting with its introduction in Campbell, 
and now, after Cariou, the transformative use defense has 
become a legal gray area, leaving artists unable to predict 
whether their use is lawful. This state of purgatory will surely 
stunt the future development of the arts. This is especially true 
as appropriation becomes more suited to audiences. The threat 
of litigation is ever increasing and has the consequence of 
  
 119 See Grant, supra note 27 (“[Cariou’s attorney] noted that Prince could have 
avoided the problem altogether by traveling to Jamaica and taking his own 
photographs that he scanned onto his canvases, but the entire point of Prince’s art is 
commentary on images that already exist in the world.”). Presumably, there was also a 
reason Prince used Cariou’s photographs and not other images of Rastafarians, though 
he would have been vulnerable to this kind of claim regardless of whose image he used.  
 120 See Eugene Kan, Richard Prince “Canal Zone” Exhibition Recap, 
HYPEBEAST (Nov. 12, 2008), http://hypebeast.com/2008/11/richard-prince-canal-zone-
exhibition-recap/; Martha Schwendener, Female Trouble: Richard Prince and Cindy 
Sherman, VILLAGE VOICE (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-12-
10/art/female-trouble-richard-prince-and-cindy-sherman/. 
 121 See generally Smith, supra note 23. 
 122 Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of Richard Prince at 43, Cariou v. 
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08 Civ. 11327 (DAB)). 
 123 Leval, supra note 15, at 1118-19. 
1540 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
discouraging artists. Moreover, licensing can be too 
burdensome to undertake. Fair use could support an 
environment of creativity and sharing within the art world if 
courts realize the importance of a visual language to artists 
and relax the requirement that artist’s testimony and intent fit 
squarely into a legal standard.  
Many have suggested, quite correctly, that copyright 
law as it has developed, and continues to develop, is ill-suited 
to the schools of art that employ appropriation in their work.124 
If the Southern District’s decision is upheld, the effect will not 
only chill Richard Prince’s forthcoming work, but also that of 
all artists that “build upon previous works in ways that add 
value and create new meanings, but do not necessarily comment 
on the earlier work.”125 Furthermore, appropriation is becoming 
an increasingly useful visual tool. With the proliferation of the 
Internet and digital technologies, the current generation has 
only become more visual and commercial.126 The law should not 
push back on the natural evolution of culture, but should 
embrace these popular forms of expression and conform to the 
practices that are relevant in the modern day.127 If the visual 
arts are to remain relevant and meaningful, then artists who 
choose to comment on society and contemporary issues will 
continue to find it necessary to refer to images, popular culture, 
and their own surroundings. While classical styles and 
expressive veins in art will surely remain, new movements 
often incorporate references to pop culture, photography, or 
any countless number of works that do not originate with the 
secondary user.128 
While artists rarely consider the legal implications of 
their work during the creative process, the ramifications can be 
devastating. Indeed, one of the most influential collage artists, 
Robert Rauschenberg, “grew so sick of copyright squabbles that 
  
 124 See generally Weil, supra note 19; Badin, supra note 20; Rachel Isabelle 
Butt, Note, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1055 (2010). 
 125 Feder & Muttreja, supra note 16. 
 126 See Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s Now Likely to See an Ad., 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/ 
business/media/15everywhere.html?pagewanted=all, for discussion. 
 127 Some argue that the speed with which the network of image sharing is 
growing cannot be slowed regardless of what courts deem lawful. See Kennedy, supra 
note 25 (“[T]oday’s flow of creative expression, riding a tide of billions of instantly 
accessible digital images and clips, is rapidly becoming so free and recycling so 
reflexive that it is hard to imagine it being slowed, much less stanched, whatever 
happens in court.”).  
 128 See supra note 68. 
2013] TRANSFORMATIVE USE & THREATS TO APPROPRIATION 1541 
he eventually abandoned the practice of exploiting the 
photography of others . . . .”129 Artists that become aware of the 
massive damages that Prince and his gallery face will have no 
choice but to pursue other techniques, because it is a rare artist 
that can afford such a financial blow and survive. Cariou and 
his legal counsel argue that art can only benefit from a stricter 
fair use standard, even if artists must defend the work in 
court.130 They are misguided. Art history undoubtedly benefits 
from having Robert Rauschenbergs and Richard Princes. While 
the Cariou decision protects the exclusive rights set forth in the 
Copyright Act, it loses sight of the Constitutional goal of 
promotion of creativity and the arts. In other words, the 
exclusive rights are protected at the expense of copyright law’s 
ultimate goal; the forest is lost for the trees. 
Over the past few years, copyright litigation has become 
increasingly frequent.131 One article posted on Clancco, an art 
law blog created by Associate Director of Volunteer Lawyers for 
the Arts Sergio Munoz Sarmiento, argues that a reason for the 
increased litigation is an effort to develop more pro-plaintiff 
law.132 Artists such as Chapman Kelly, Shepard Fairey, Thierry 
Guetta, and of course, Richard Prince have all been involved in 
copyright litigation that threatens certain of their works.133 And 
more and more lesser known artists are also becoming involved 
in copyright litigation.134 The substantial damages available 
provide an incentive to diligently monitor one’s work. In turn, 
this creates a dangerous environment in which to create. 
A major problem is that judges will order that work be 
destroyed, like the court in Cariou ordered. To prevent viewers 
from experiencing an entire body of work by an important 
contemporary artist seems inconsistent with the goals of 
copyright. “When the copyright law is used—as it was in 
  
 129 SUSAN M. BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS: A SURVIVAL GUIDE: BLUNT TALK 
ABOUT ART AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 87 (2006). On the other hand, if—as I am 
proposing—fair use offers broader protection for artists, it is “not likely” that the 
authors of the originals would similarly stop creating work simply because another 
may legally use the work in a new piece. See Weaver, supra note 5.  
 130 See Sarmiento, supra note 6; Weaver, supra note 5. 
 131 See Sarmiento, supra note 6 (“More and more, artists, other individuals, 
and corporations are suing artists . . . .”); see also Coe, supra note 49. 
 132 Sarmiento, supra note 6. 
 133 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. 
Ct. 380 (2011); Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 
2011); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Kennedy, supra note 7. 
 134 Sarmiento, supra note 6. Several articles explain the history of 
appropriation as a tool in the visual arts. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 5; Weil, supra 
note 19; Butt, supra note 124. 
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[Rogers]—not merely to award damages but actually to 
suppress a work of art, then its effect is to diminish the stock of 
reality available to all of those who might one day have come 
into contact with that work.”135 
Advocates for copyright plaintiffs argue that there is no 
problem with requiring artists to license the images that they 
choose to incorporate in their work just as music samplers 
must license the songs that they use in their mixes.136 But this 
is not as simple as these licensing proponents make it out to be. 
Licensing in the visual art world is impractical, sometimes 
impossible, and serves only the copyright holders and not the 
objectives of copyright laid out in the Constitution. If the artist 
cannot obtain a license, then the work will suffer. Where it is 
difficult or impossible to obtain a license, the goals of copyright are 
arguably deterred because by prohibiting the use of certain images, 
the artist’s choices are narrowed, stifling artistic progress.137 
It is important that artists be able to use images from 
other sources than their own creation. The reason for this is 
colloquially explained in the phrase “a picture is worth a thousand 
words.” Indeed, “images cannot be adequately defined at all, either 
by words or by other images.”138 The image itself is necessary. If 
Prince had painted slightly similar images of Rastafarians, the 
message would be muddied, if not lost altogether.  
  
 135 Weil, supra note 19, at 838. 
 136 See LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 7:54; see 
also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993); Grand Upright Music, 
Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records., Inc. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 137 The issue of obtaining a license often informs another prong of the first 
factor: bad faith. However, the relationship between attempts to license and bad faith 
is often murky, and whereas Judge Batts used Prince’s failure to seek permission as 
support for a finding of bad faith, “Blanch squarely held that, in assessing fair use, the 
failure to seek permission cannot be deemed bad faith.” Feder & Muttreja, supra note 
16. Additionally, because of the heavily image based society that has come about since the 
rise of the internet, the “ideological baggage” that used to be associated with appropriation 
has all but vanished. Kennedy, supra note 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Judge Leval strongly opposes any consideration of bad faith in determining 
fair use. Leval, supra note 15, at 1126. Bad faith should not be a consideration in the 
fair use defense. This factor is irrelevant to the purposes of both copyright and the fair 
use doctrine and serves only to muddy the waters. Judge Leval expressed his 
disagreement with the use of a bad faith factor in his article, saying that “[t]his 
practice . . . is misguided.” Id. (“[Questioning the morality of the use] produces 
anomalies that conflict with the goals of copyright and adds to the confusion 
surrounding the doctrine.”) In correctly pointing out that such a question is “tempting” 
to judges, Leval argues that there is no legal reason for such a “morality test.” Id. 
These questions often pollute fair use questions, especially when dealing with cryptic 
and sometimes arrogant artists who have limited legal tact. 
 138 Weil, supra note 19, at 839. 
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An artist’s work is not devoid of a legally condoned use 
(that is, that the work is a commentary on an appropriated 
work) merely because the artist does not correctly assert a legal 
ground for the use (that is, that they intended to comment on 
the work). The very idea behind appropriation art is that it 
“create[s] a new situation, and therefore, a new meaning or set 
of meanings, for a familiar image.”139 The creator often sees the 
work very differently from others and rarely has a true sense of 
the legal consequences of his own words. Artists are frequently 
called upon to talk about their work. To an individual who is 
unfamiliar with the case law, even with guidance by counsel, 
that person’s own vanities, sensitivities, and tendencies are 
likely to obstruct their answers in a deposition or on the stand. 
Judge Batts emphasized that “[Prince’s] intent was not 
transformative within the meaning of Section 107.”140 But this 
is not the test that Judge Leval proposed when he coined the 
transformative use idea. And it is not the test that judges 
should apply today. To rely so heavily on the testimony of the 
artist leaves society’s exposure to valuable cultural reference in 
the hands of art makers, who are not versed in the law, have 
very different perspectives than judges and lawyers, and may 
not realize the impact that their words can have.141  
Moreover, heavy reliance on the need to comment on the 
original closes a tremendous door for artists. The Supreme 
Court in Campbell noted that 2 Live Crew’s comment on the 
Roy Orbison original was important to the analysis, but to make 
this a requirement for fair use in the visual arts is too narrow of 
an analysis and bars key uses that should be deemed legal.142  
C. Current Solutions 
There have been many suggestions on how to loosen the 
constraints on fair use and transformative use. Some attempts 
at expanding the public domain are the Creative Commons 
Project, and a similar project attempted by the BBC.143 
  
 139 See Appropriation, TATE GLOSSARY, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20120203094030/http://www.tate.org.uk/collections/glossary/definition.jsp?entryId=23 (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
 140 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 141 On appeal, the two opinions disagreed as to whether the court should have 
considered Richard Prince’s testimony. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 713 (2d Cir. 
2013) (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 142  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 143 About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2012). The BBC “Creative Archive” project ended in 2006, shortly after its 
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Essentially, these programs allow creators to designate their 
material as usable by others, with options of how their work may 
be used and which uses are protected.144 These programs take a 
welcome step in the right direction; however they ultimately 
rely on individual creators’ altruism or personal beliefs, and 
the artists’ willingness to actively pursue these licenses.145 
Moreover, the scheme is one that approaches this problem by 
limiting copyright protections as opposed to expanding fair use 
exceptions.146 While an expansion of fair uses necessarily 
implies a limitation on copyright, it makes sense for the change 
to come from the fair use front because that is the camp more 
closely devoted to free expression.147 
Courts should err on the side of dissemination of the 
arts. Lawrence Lessig proposes an alternative approach to fair 
use, arguing that the United States articulate a strict set of 
protected uses and deem all other uses presumptively fair.148 
This approach is essentially the opposite of many international 
copyright schemes.149 Such a dramatic overhaul of the fair use 
jurisprudence would likely take years and would be incredibly 
complicated, contested, and subject to fierce lobbying. But in 
the context of appropriation, a less drastic measure could 
provide the freedom necessary to keep artists creating while 
protecting copyright’s necessary and beneficial facets. 
  
advent. BBC Creative Archive Pilot, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/creativearchive/ (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
 144 See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
 145 In order to secure a Creative Commons or similar license, one needs to 
affirmatively designate that the work is under a Creative Commons license. See 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
 146 Several suggestions for a more liberal copyright scheme take this 
approach. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 738-58 (2012). 
 147 See supra note 35. 
 148 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 295 (2004) (“[T]he law should mark 
the uses that are protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not 
protected.”). 
 149 Most other countries have a much more strictly codified fair use doctrine 
where the types of non-infringing uses are listed and “rarely, if ever, [will their courts] 
depart from the statutes to find limitations of their own for other types of conduct not 
envisioned ex-ante by the legislature.” JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL 
INFORMATION ECONOMY 531 (2010). This highlights a positive aspect of the U.S. fair 
use doctrine—that we do have more leeway. Unfortunately, courts are often reluctant 
to take advantage of this freedom when faced with visual art incorporating 
appropriated works. 
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IV. COURTS SHOULD USE A SEPARATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS 
FOR THE VISUAL ARTS 
A.  Fair Use Should Focus on the Distinct Artistic Purpose 
Fair use is purposefully ambiguous.150 However, a lack of 
a bright line rule should not turn the courts into arbiters of 
social value. While an ambiguous transformative use standard 
may provide more opportunities for attorneys who can pose 
strong arguments on either side, it can be troubling and 
limiting for artists that must balance creativity with legality.151 
The deeper question of transformative use should therefore be 
clarified to help guide courts when dealing with these kinds of 
cases. Works should be deemed transformative whenever the 
secondary use serves a different artistic purpose.  
Both Richard Prince’s Canal Zone and Jeff Koons’s 
String of Puppies used the original work for a different purpose 
than the original artist: to comment on societies. Prince was 
creating a fictional world, whereas Cariou was portraying a 
reality. Similarly, Koons was highlighting kitsch and cliché, 
whereas Rogers was capturing an adorable image to print on 
greeting cards. The respective messages—while both valid—
were entirely distinct.152 “Visual artists, above all, need a fair 
use rule that is both flexible and spacious enough to permit 
them a considerable degree of appropriation.”153 
According to Judge Leval, “[T]he [secondary] use must 
be productive and must employ the [original work] in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the original”154; 
it must “add[] value to the original.”155 The transformative use 
question is central to issues involving appropriation art and 
  
 150 “Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine 
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since 
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is 
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
 151 See Grant, supra note 27.  
 152 Patrick Cariou’s photographs in Yes, Rasta are documentary style 
“portraits.” Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Richard Prince, 
on the other hand, used Cariou’s photos as “ingredients” in the “recipe” that became 
Canal Zone. Videotaped Deposition, supra note 122, at 30. Prince was creating a set of 
collaged paintings that paid tribute to his predecessors such as Willem DeKooning. Id. at 156. 
 153 As Weil points out, this would also apply to “slides, transparencies, and 
printed illustrations,” so that the art world could function efficiently from artist to 
collector to museum to gallery. Weil, supra note 19, at 839. 
 154 Leval, supra note 15, at 1111.  
 155 Id. 
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therefore adjustments to the transformative use law will likely 
have an actual effect on the outcomes of these cases. Courts 
must unequivocally abandon the notion that in order for a 
secondary work of visual art to be deemed transformative it 
must comment on the original. This limitation severely limits 
artistic freedom. Art that uses appropriated images does so for a 
variety of reasons, far beyond a desire to critique or parody a 
specific work.156 Art law scholar Stephen E. Weil points out that 
“[a]rtists have always perceived the environment around them as 
both inspiration to act and as raw material to mold and remold.”157  
Artists must have the freedom to play with images, 
particularly in an age where images dominate daily life and the 
internet makes access to images and visual culture effortless.158 
In the past, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
been receptive to this idea,159 but no court has yet to confidently 
establish a precedent that allows artists the legal safety to 
work in this way. Instead, a preference for parody has 
dominated ever since the Supreme Court decided Campbell 
and, while parody is certainly an effective tool, and one that 
should be protected, “[p]arody is by no means the only mode by 
which one work of art may refer to another in order to achieve 
a desired artistic effect.”160 Indeed, statements that extend to 
society at large and comment on contemporary culture are 
arguably more important to art history and expression than 
those that are specific to a certain work. Jeff Koons’s message 
about banality and kitsch is arguably more profound than 2 
Live Crew’s statement about Roy Orbison’s pop song. Both 
statements should be protected, and in both cases, the original 
  
 156 See Julie C. Van Camp, Originality in Postmodern Appropriation Art, 36 J. 
ARTS, MGMT., L., & SOC’Y 247, 247 (2007).  
 157 Weil, supra note 19, at 836. 
 158 See supra Part III.B. 
 159 See Feder & Muttreja, supra note 16 (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Doris 
Kindersley, 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2006)) (“[T]he Second Circuit rejected a ‘limited 
interpretation of transformative use’ under which ‘each reproduced image should have 
been accompanied by comment or criticism related to the artistic nature of the image.’”). 
 160 Weil, supra note 19, at 838. Parody is a desirable fair use because, often, 
authors and creators are not inclined to license their work if they feel they are going to 
be made light of or have their reputation belittled. See Landes, supra note 5, at 21 
(“When the parody targets the plaintiff’s work, the parties are unlikely to come to 
terms on a price that allows the defendant to make fun, embarrass, or even humiliate 
the plaintiff’s work.”). The problem is that fear of parody is not the only reason an 
artist might keep their work from being used by others.  
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artist is likely to dislike the message that his work is being 
used to convey.161  
B. Factors to be Weighed Under the Artistic Purpose 
Standard 
Copyright law needs a new transformative use standard 
that gives artists more freedom to engage in uses that should 
be allowed, while outlawing those that are purely piracy. There 
are several factors, a balancing of which could determine 
whether the work serves a different artistic purpose and thus 
is transformative of the original. These factors include: (i) the 
objective difference between the two works, (ii) expert 
testimony from art historians and critics, and (iii) the artist’s 
intent. This approach would widen the fair use defense, but 
would bring the law closer to achieving the policy goals laid out 
in the Constitution.  
First, the objective difference between the original and 
the new work will serve as an important prong under this 
standard. This factor has traditionally been important to the 
first factor of the fair use analysis.162 If the important legal 
difference between a transformative work and the original is 
that it serves a new artistic purpose, then the visual difference 
that a viewer experiences plays a part in that analysis. The 
objective difference can distinguish secondary works that use 
the original for inspiration from those that use the original in a 
more substantial way, which would deserve more explanation.163 
If the visible differences between the original and the secondary 
use are great, that difference will weigh heavily toward a 
finding of fair use.  
The second element in this new standard—expert 
testimony from art historians and critics—will work towards 
  
 161 If a reason to offer fair use protection is a reluctance to license for fear of 
reputational damage, an artist like Art Rogers might understandably be offended that 
his work is being used to comment on the banal. 
 162 Although courts have not typically analyzed the objective differences in 
their own category, most transformative use visual arts cases begin with a detailed 
description of the two works, indicating that the medium and overall aesthetic of the 
work is important to the court. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 
2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1992); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 337, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 163 An example of an artist using the original as “inspiration” would be Jeff 
Koons’s use in Blanch where that particular style of advertising informed the 
secondary work. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247. Under this standard, frivolous claims will 
be dismissed, but this initial inquiry will heavily tip the scale in favor of fair use where 
just enough use remains to survive a motion to dismiss.  
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revealing the outside purpose of the work: that which “may 
reasonably be perceived.”164 An article in Hyperallergic, a forum 
for art related issues and topic discussions, addresses some of 
these issues and advocates for introducing expert testimony so 
that judges are not acting as art historians.165 Experts in the art 
world such as critics, curators, and historians can provide 
substantial information about the artistic value and purpose of 
a work of art. This will particularly help with cases dealing 
with major art players.166 Experts can testify on both the artistic 
functions of each work—meaning both the original and the 
secondary—as well as each artist’s reputation and body of 
work. Such information can often—though not always—say a 
great deal about an artist, give insight into whether an 
appropriated work falls within a market that the original artist 
would be likely to exploit and, in some cases, add context to the 
work of the secondary artist.167  
The artist’s intent—a factor that currently plays a 
substantial role in fair use analysis—should still serve as an 
important element in evaluating the purpose and character of 
the use and whether the use is transformative.168 This is despite 
  
 164 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994). 
 165 Weaver, supra note 5. 
 166 Because many of the cases that reach this stage deal with highly successful 
artists, this testimony will be relatively valuable. Such high profile cases set the bar for 
lesser-known artists in the field. 
 167 This analysis is related to the fourth factor of fair use, “the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) 
(2006), in that often, works with different purposes will pose less of a risk to each 
other’s markets. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“[W]hen . . . the second use is 
transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not 
be so readily inferred.”). By analyzing the purpose as determinative of transformative 
nature, the subjectivity of the fourth factor as it relates to the visual arts is removed. 
Weil argues that “little or no weight” should be given to the fourth factor of § 107, and 
instead more weight to the first factor. Weil, supra note 19, at 840-41. This seems to 
square somewhat with Judge Leval’s argument.  
The ultimate objective in forming this new standard would be to reduce 
copyright litigation. Just as it might be sound copyright policy to provide 
contemporary visual artists with greater latitude than other creative 
practitioners as to what they may incorporate into their own work, it may 
also be sound policy to limit the ability of such artists to use copyright to 
impede the free circulation of images of that work within the cultural and 
commercial marketplaces.  
Id. at 840. The solution has several elements, however, all of which are necessary and 
overdue. This would, in effect, often make the fourth factor irrelevant because it is 
most unlikely that a work that expresses a different message and has a different 
purpose than the original will supplant the market for the original. Certainly there will 
nevertheless be anomalies, as in the case of Christiane Celle’s testimony in Cariou. 
 168 Historically, the way an artist testifies about the work at issue has had a 
substantial impact on the outcome of the case. Some argue that one of the central 
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the complications that this inquiry sometimes causes. While 
artist testimony can often be misleading, the importance of the 
appropriator’s vision often reflects the function of the work in 
the public. In some ways, an ingredient of morality might 
return in this element; however it would appear in a very 
different way than that which courts use today.169 If the artist 
used the original with the “good faith” intent of creating work 
with a new artistic purpose then, perhaps, that would be 
important to the question of remedies.170 
This new standard recognizes the importance of 
appropriation in art and is sensitive to and respects artist’s 
creative prerogative. The standard is more clearly defined and 
is forgiving to the visual arts, while maintaining the traditional 
flexibility of U.S. copyright law. Establishing this standard 
  
reasons for the Second Circuit’s seemingly divergent opinions in Rogers and Blanch 
was the difference in the testimony and attitude of Jeff Koons. See Grant, supra note 
27 (“Jessica Litman, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School, claimed 
that part of the reason that Koons lost [Rogers] but won [Blanch] was that ‘the first 
time he came into court with a lot of art world attitude about “I’m the artist, I can do 
whatever I want,” and the second time he made a more reasonable statement about the 
kind of message that appropriation art sends. That goes a long way.’”). 
  Indeed, “[l]awyers and artists sometimes just don’t speak the same 
language.” Eric Randall, Lawyers and Artists Don’t Always Speak the Same Language, 
ATL. WIRE, Dec. 28, 2011, available at http://www.theatlanticwire.com/entertainment/ 
2011/12/lawyers-and-artists-dont-always-speak-same-language/46740/. Courts like to 
hear testimony that connects directly to the legal test to be applied and often, artists 
pontificate in broad, abstract terms with several meanings, few of which speak to the 
elements of the legal standard. 
 169 For example, in Cariou, the court emphasized Prince’s “bad faith” for 
failing to seek permission to use the photos. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 170 Remedies play an extremely important role in copyright litigation. This is 
because of the massive damages that can be awarded—particularly when statutory 
damages are available—as well as the crushing equitable remedies and, finally, the 
availability of attorney’s fees.  
  Statutory damages, which are available under the circumstances listed in 
17 U.S.C. § 412, can range from $750 to $30,000 per infringement, and can be raised to 
$150,000 per infringement upon a showing of “willful[ness].” 17 U.S.C. § 504. For a 
critical analysis of statutory damages in copyright law, see Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009). 
  The Cariou case ordered significant remedies for the plaintiff. It has been 
described as a “very harsh decision.” Weaver, supra note 5. Judge Batts ordered that 
the defendants be “enjoined and restrained permanently” from continuing to exploit 
any of the work that used Cariou’s images, and that they “deliver up for impounding, 
destruction, or other disposition, . . . all infringing copies of [Cariou’s] [p]hotographs,” 
as well as “notify in writing any current or future owners of [Prince’s infringing] 
[p]aintings . . . that the [p]aintings were not lawfully made . . . and . . . cannot lawfully 
be displayed . . . .” Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56. 
  Finally, attorney’s fees provide an incentive for plaintiff’s such as Cariou to 
initiate these lawsuits. See Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994). After 
Fogarty, there is also an incentive for defendants to litigate infringement cases because 
attorney’s fees may be available for prevailing defendants. Id. at 534. 
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would provide a regime that artists could look to, and would 
give more freedom to artists who use these techniques in their 
work. This would encourage more creation and lessen the 
bureaucracy associated with licensing images and with 
defending a claim in court. Moreover, the elements of this new 
transformative use question provide boundaries to fair use that 
protect the limited monopoly that copyright is meant to 
provide. Uses that clearly steal the image for no new artistic 
purpose, with minimal objective differences, and with purely 
economic intent will not pass this transformative use analysis, 
and will therefore, in all likelihood, fail the fair use test. This 
standard tracks the expectation of artists—as well as the 
arguments presented by their lawyers—and therefore avoids the 
impossible result of forcing artists to engage in a legal analysis 
in order to use appropriation in a body of artwork. Adoption of 
this standard ensures that artists have the freedom to create 
and that the goals of the Copyright Act are respected.  
CONCLUSION 
Aptly touching on many of the important points in the 
battle between copyright and appropriation art, Stephen E. 
Weil predicts that 
if our society is to continue to be enriched by the vigorous production 
and distribution of original works of visual art, then visual artists 
need a license to forage widely—far more widely than conventionally 
interpreted copyright law might permit—in gathering the raw 
materials out of which to compose their work.171  
Judge Leval believed it was important to remember that 
copyright is not a natural right inherent in the fabric of our 
nation or moral customs.172 Instead, copyright is granted in the 
Constitution as an incentive for people to create. Fair use, and 
thus transformative use, is the other side of the same coin. 
These doctrines protect creativity by creating space in which 
authors and artists may work. This space must be protected. 
And although fair use will likely remain a subjective, fact-
based question, some parameters must be set if the defense is 
to be useful to artists in any way.  
  
 171 Weil, supra note 19, at 840. 
 172  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1107 (1990). 
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If artists have the freedom to use images without the 
restriction of having to comment on the original, the goals of 
copyright will ultimately be realized. Moreover, the 
requirement that the secondary work serve a distinct artistic 
purpose will maintain the balance that protects the copyright 
holders. Artists still must create work with a message and for a 
purpose—with a goal of creating their own work—if they are to 
use the images of others. For art to be productive, it must have 
some message, even if the message is about art-making in 
general. This standard does not legalize piracy or useless 
copying. Instead, it promotes valuable art and protects artists’ 
prerogative to experiment, comment, and promote creativity. It 
is true that “sometimes art and law don’t align well,”173 but if 
the goal of copyright is to promote the arts, then when art and 
law collide, it should be the law that yields. 
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 173 Randall, supra note 168. 
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